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ABSTRACT
EFFECTIVENESS OF RESERVE REQUIREMENTS
ON CURRENT ACCOUNT IMBALANCES
DALKIRAN, Dils¸at Tugba
M.A., Department of Economics
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Selin Sayek Bo¨ke
July 2012
Following the recent financial crisis, reserve requirements have become a pol-
icy instrument preferred in many emerging markets such as China, Brazil
and Turkey for various purposes. Therefore, the formulating a theoretical
framework to study the policy effectiveness remains an important issue. In
this thesis, I develop a DSGE model with the financial accelerator mechanism
so as to see the effectiveness of reserve requirement in small open economies,
especially in influencing the external imbalances. External imbalances can
either be interpreted as current account imbalances or its mirroring capital
account imbalances. The main channel through which the external balances
play a role is via the banking sector, which is modelled as engaging in interna-
tional borrowing. This framework allows examination of the responses of the
external imbalances to shocks to the reserve requirement ratio As a result,
higher reserve requirements make domestic borrowing cheaper than foreign
borrowing and by this way, changes in net foreign liabilities create a current
account surplus. Thus, a country with current account deficit can use reserve
requirements to readjust its external imbalances.
Keywords: DSGE, Financial Accelerator, Reserve Requirements, Current Ac-
count
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O¨ZET
MUNZAM KARS¸ILIKLARININ CARI˙ AC¸IK
U¨ZERI˙NDEKI˙ ETKI˙SI˙
DALKIRAN, Dils¸at Tugba
M.A., I˙ktisat Bo¨lu¨mu¨
Tez Yo¨neticisi: Doc¸. Dr. Selin Sayek Bo¨ke
Temmuz 2012
Son finansal krizden sonra munzam kars¸ılıkları C¸in, Brezilya ve Tu¨rkiye gibi
birc¸ok gelis¸mekte olan u¨lke tarafından farklı sebeplerle sıklıkla kullanılan bir
para politikası aracı olmaya bas¸ladı. Bu sebeple, munzam kars¸ılıklarının
tesirlilig˘inin arka plandaki teorisi o¨nem kazandı. Bu makalede munzam kars¸ılık-
larının gelis¸mekte olan u¨lkelerdeki tesirlerine, o¨zellikle dıs¸sal dengesizlikler
u¨zerindeki tesirlerine, bakmak ic¸in finansal hızlandırıcılı bir DSGE model
tasarladım. Dıs¸sal dengesizlikler cari dengesizlikler olarak yorumlanabilir.
Dıs¸sal dengesizliklerin rol aldıg˘ı ana kanallar bankacılık sekto¨ru¨ oldug˘u ic¸in
bu sektor dıs¸arıdan borc¸ alabilir s¸ekilde tasarlandı. Bu tasarı, munzam
kars¸ılıklarının dıs¸sal dengesizlikler u¨zerindeki etkilerini go¨rmede yardımcı oldu.
Sonuc¸ olarak, yu¨ksek munzam kars¸ılıkları yerel kaynaklı borcu yabancı kay-
naklı borca go¨re daha ucuz yaptı ve bo¨ylelikle net yabancı yu¨ku¨mlu¨lu¨klerdeki
deg˘is¸iklik cari fazla yarattı. Bu sebeple, cari ac¸ıg˘ı olan bir u¨lke dıs¸sal denge-
sizliklerini du¨zeltmek ic¸in munzam kars¸ılıklarını kullanabilir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: DSGE, Finansal Hızlandırıcı, Munzam Kars¸ılıkları, Cari
Ac¸ık
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
While many of the developed economies continue to suffer from the negative
effects of the latest financial crisis, some of the emerging countries such as
China and Turkey have been experiencing rapid economic growth. Although
achieving large positive growth rates is a permanent goal of emerging markets,
such large growth rates may cause unwarranted macroeconomic instabilities.
For instance, in case of Turkey, positive economic growth has brought about
a credit extension in the economy and a resulting strong rise in aggregate de-
mand. This rise in aggregate demand also gets reflected in increased imports
which refers to a widening current account deficit.
Whether be it deficits or surpluses, some economies have always been
trying to rebalance their current account, as a share of GDP, to remain at
least at a certain level for macroeconomic stability. This rebalancing in the
external imbalances is a difficult task, for which the policy makers do not have
an agreed set of instruments. During the recent phase of the recent financial
crisis, with the rising importance of unconventional monetary policies, we
observe that Turkey has used reserve requirements as a remedy for external
imbalances. Although by using required reserves, Turkish Central Bank’s
primary aim is to optimize the credit structure and in the end improve the
macro-prudential framework, it has also aimed to adjust country’s current
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account position. In this sense, Turkey has recently increased its weighted
average reserve requirement ratio to 12.6% (Bas¸c¸ı and Kara [2011]).
As stated in the Turkish financial stability report, Turkey aimed at high
reserve requirements and wide interest rate corridor to overcome the widening
current account deficit. Basci and Kara [2011] state that despite the recent
tendency of using required reserves as a tool to tackle for current accounts,
an agreed upon theoretical framework which allows a discussion of the long-
run effects of this policy is needed. Additionally, they strongly emphasize
the fact that these kind of monetary policy combinations are country-focused
and case-sensitive. The structure and deepness of financial system, current
macroeconomic conditions and characteristics of capital movements are the
factors that can change the effectiveness of reserve requirements (Bas¸c¸ı and
Kara [2011]). Although one can predict through which channels reserve re-
quirements may affect the current account deficit, lack of a theoretical back-
ground in the literature makes the long run implications of the policy vague.
In order to study how reserve requirements affect the external imbalances
in emerging markets a framework consistent with the emerging market styl-
ized facts should be constructed.. The external balances can be defined as
the change in the net foreign assets (NFA) of the economy. However,it is
not only the level of the NFA holdings that matters, but also the composi-
tion of who holds these assets. Data from Turkey shows that the financial
sector borrowing has increased and its ratio to nonfinancial borrowing has
approached to unity after 2009. (see figure 1.1 and 1.2). However, in most
of the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models, the role of
financial sector is neglected (Montoro [2010]). Therefore, in order to evaluate
the effectiveness of reserve requirements in Turkey, we should develop such a
model that reflects this high financial sector borrowing phenomena.
This thesis examines the effectiveness of required reserves on the current
account imbalances in Turkey. The most distinct feature of this model is
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Figure 1.1: Gross External Debts
Figure 1.2: Ratio of Financial to Non-Financial Debts
the banking sector with costly banking activities and the existence of sub-
stitutable sources of intermediated funds: domestic banks loans and funds
obtained directly from abroad.
In Chapter 2, the literature on the external imbalances and reserve re-
quirements is reviewed. Chapter 3 outlines the model. Chapter 4, reports
the quantitative analysis. Conclusions and future research questions are dis-
cussed in Chapter 6.
3
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
There are several papers examining the effectiveness of monetary policies on
current account adjustment. For example, Ferrero, Svensson and Gertler ex-
amine the monetary policy effectiveness on the aggregate economic behaviours
on the economy with the given current account adjustment scenarios (Ferrero
et al. [2008]). First of these is the slow burn where the rebalancing of current
account is slow and smooth. There are no major shocks but the steady dol-
lar depreciation puts pressure on CPI inflation. The second one is fast burn
where we see rapid reversals in the current account balance of a country.
These reversals are modelled as changes in the beliefs about the future pro-
ductivity of the home country. They use simple interest rate rule, producer
inflation targeting rule, consumer price inflation targeting rule, exchange rate
targeting rule but not required reserves or any other unconventional mone-
tary policy. Additionally, the model is for developed countries but not for
developing countries. They do not allow any movements in risk premium
because in developed countries the risk premium does not play as impor-
tant role as in developing countries. However, in this paper, the existence of
external finance premium creates the accelerator mechanism in the system
and this mechanism amplifies the shocks to the economy. Among the results
they reach, the most important one is that monetary policy works poorly
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against international variables such as current account. As a contribution, I
will extend the model into developing country case and use different mone-
tary policies. I assume that the existence of an accelerator mechanism makes
monetary policies more effective on international variables.
Secondly, Glocker and Towbin [2012] examine the situations in which
reserve requirements are suitable for achieving price and financial stability.
They use a small open economy DSGE model with financial accelerator mech-
anism. They use such a mechanism in order to ensure that endogenous devel-
opments in credit market amplify and propagate the shocks to the economy
(Bernanke et al. [1999]). They find that with the existence of financial fric-
tions, reserve requirements can support the price stability objective. Also,
reserve requirements have substantial effects on economic stability if central
banks have financial stability objective. Though it is not their main focus,
they find (but do not discuss) that increase in reserve requirements creates a
surplus in current account. As a contribution to this paper, I will discuss the
mechanism reserve requirements affect external imbalances. Additionally, an
the most importantly, I will add a more realistic financial sector to the model.
Since the latest financial crisis, unconventional monetary policies become
very widely used, especially given the increasing ineffectiveness of interest
rates as a monetary policy tool. For example, as an unconventional monetary
policy, FED has helped private credit banks to prevent them from collapsing.
This monetary policy caused balance sheet deterioration as well as tightened
borrowing-lending standards. Gertler and Karadi [2010] capture the key ele-
ments of central banks financial intermediation and try to model it. Before
them, neither Bernanke et al. [1999] nor other conventional monetary pol-
icy models have considered central bank intermediation. Gertler and Karadi
[2010] analysis fills this gap. As a conclusion, they state that central bank
intermediation (credit policy) become efficient during the crisis because the
existing balance sheet constraints on private intermediaries tighten lending
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standards. Especially, under zero lower bound case, this effect doubles. One
important point here is as the economy returns to normal, the effects of us-
ing unconventional monetary policy diminishes. Therefore, they claim that,
other than crisis times, using unconventional monetary policy is meaning-
less. They also conclude that, for certain types of lending such as CI loans
that require constant monitoring of borrowers, capital injections may be pre-
ferred compared to intermediation. Apart from analysing the effectiveness
of an unconventional monetary policy and using the DSGE model with fi-
nancial accelerator mechanism, Gertler and Karadi [2010] paper do not have
any common feature with my question. However, since the paper holds a
very important place in unconventional monetary policy literature, I find it
appropriate to include it in this section.
This kind of country-specific studies are not limited to the USA. Mimir
et al. examine the effects of reserve requirements, as a macroprudential pol-
icy tool, on the transmission mechanism of monetary shocks and productivity
in Turkey. It is a closed economy with aggregate uncertainty due to money
growth shocks and productivity shocks. In order to understand the role of
time varying reserve requirement (rr), they solve the model for three alter-
native cases: no rr case, constant rr case, time varying rr case. Banks are
constructed as in Gertler and Karadi [2010] and they incorporate the bank-
ing sector explicitly. Different from Gertler and Karadi [2010], the central
bank does not issue government debt, its intervention to the market is con-
strained with changing rrr. Central bank controls the supply of money and
determines the rr rate according to deviations of bank leverage from steady
state.One of the main findings is that rr rate dampens the effect of financial
accelerator in response to productivity shock with the cost of high inflation.
Negative productivity shock causes bank credit to decline due to demand and
supply channels in deposit markets. Once the time varying rr is introduced
(a decrease in rrr), credit declines and equity financing declines have stopped.
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When there is a monetary shock, on the other hand, the story will be saving
and investment based but result is the same. In this market all the shocks
work through deposit markets.
As it is seen, the movements of current account in response to monetary
policy shocks and the effectiveness of reserve requirements have been exam-
ined by various paper. However, when we look at the these highly selective
literature, we see that the there is not any paper which explicitly discuss the
effectiveness of reserve requirements on external imbalances (current/capital
account imbalances). Therefore, this thesis fills this gap. Additionally, de-
spite the prominent role of financial sector, the papers which study on reserve
requirements use a simple financial sector. Hence, the most distinct feature
of this thesis will be the more realistic financial sector for Turkey case.
7
CHAPTER 3
MODEL
Central banks’ main aim at increasing the reserve requirement levels is to
affect the credit growth in the country, so that people stop consuming more
and government prevents large current account imbalance. In my opinion,
in order to observe through which channels required reserves affect current
account, we should reflect country specific features. In this sense, I will add
a banking sector with multiple borrowing channels. Therefore, I develop a
DSGE model with financial accelerator mechanism and sticky prices which
was first developed by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist [1999]. Following
Glocker and Towbin [2012], I allow multiple intermediaries. Different from
them, I modify the role of financial sector by adding a foreign borrowing
channel to the system.
There are five types of agents, including households, entrepreneurs, inter-
mediate goods producers, final good producers and capital good producers.
The model includes two types of banks one that functions only as a lending
institution, while the other functions as a deposit bank. Lastly, the model in-
cludes a government which sets both fiscal and monetary policies. The details
of the fiscal and monetary policy will be provided below.
Households consume, save, work and live forever. They keep their savings
at the deposit banks and these savings constitute loans to the entrepreneurs.
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Entrepreneurs’ duty entails renting capital to intermediate goods produc-
ers by purchasing capital from capital goods producers. They purchase cap-
ital at the beginning of the period and resell them at the end of the period.
This purchase of capital is financed by entrepreneurial worth and borrowing
from lending banks. They are assumed to be risk neutral and have constant
probability γ of surviving next period. Such kind of surviving probability is
assumed to ensure that entrepreneurs cannot continuously accumulate their
net worth over time. Also, this kind of assumption guarantees that the en-
trepreneurs will always need to borrow.
Intermediate good producers use labor input from households and capital
from entrepreneurs. They sell their intermediate goods to final goods pro-
ducers who produce final goods and sell them to households as consumption
good and to capital goods producers as investment good.
As mentioned above, there are two types of banks in the economy. De-
posit banks are subject to reserve requirements set by the government and
their liabilities that allow asset accumulation is provided by deposits from
households. They lend part of their deposits to lending banks which allow us
to introduce interbank interest rate as a monetary policy instrument for an
interest rate rule. Lending banks do not have a relationship with households.
They only provide loans to entrepreneurs by issuing foreign denominated
bonds and lending from deposit banks. There is one kind of reserve require-
ment which is the requirement in domestic currency. Although the bonds hold
by lending bankers are foreign currency denominated, they are converted to
domestic currency immediately so that required reserves can only in domestic
currency.
Before proceeding with the details of the model, the main framework of
the model is provided in figure 3.1 to make the model clear for the reader.
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Figure 3.1: Framework of the Model
3.1 Households
There is a continuum of households. They get utility from consumption and
disutility from working. Their utility function is
u(Ct, ht) = lnCt −Ψ h
1+φ
t
1 + φ
(3.1)
Here, C stands for consumption, h is working hours whereas φ is inverse
of Frisch labor supply elasticity.
Ct = (C
H
t )
γ(CFt )
(1−γ) (3.2)
Pt = (P
H
t )
γ(P Ft )
(1−γ) (3.3)
Consumption and resulting price levels are Cobb-Douglas. γ share of their
consumption is on domestic goods and the rest is on imported goods. CHt
denotes domestic consumption while CFt denotes foreign good consumption.
Additionally, PHt is domestic price level while P
F
t is foreign price level. For-
eign currency price is normalized to one: P Ft = St
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Households consume and save by investing deposits at deposit banks.
Their income includes labour income, taxes (or transfers), dividends from
deposits banks DivSt and intermediate good producers Div
R
t and gross inter-
est payments on their deposits. Thus, their period budget constraint is as
follows:
PtCt + PtDt ≤ iDt−1PtDt−1 + PtWtht + Pt
∑
j∈S,R
Divjt + PtTt (3.4)
Here, Wt is nominal wage rate while Tt is taxes.
Thus, households maximize 3.1 subject to 3.4 which gives the following
standard optimality conditions for consumption/saving and labour supply:
1 = EtΛt,t+1
iDt
pit+1
(3.5)
Wt = Ψh
φ
tCt (3.6)
where the stochastic discount factor is Λt,t+1 = β
Ct
Ct+1
and the gross inflation
rate is pit+1 =
Pt+1
Pt
.
3.2 Capital Goods Producers
Capital good producers buy investment goods, It, from final good producers
at the price of 1 and combine them with previously installed capital stock,
Kt−1, and sell them as capital, Kt, to entrepreneurs at the price of Qt. The
production technology of firms producing capital goods exhibits constants
returns to scale:
Υt(It, Kt−1) = It − X
2
(
It
Kt−1
− δ
)2
Kt−1. (3.7)
Investment goods and consumption goods are the same. Capital de-
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preciates at the rate of δ and is subject to a quadratic adjustment cost of
X
2
(
It
Kt−1
− δ
)2
Kt−1. The parameter X measures the sensitivity of changes
in the price of capital to changes in the investment to capital ratio. Since
the capital is sold under the competitive equilibrium, in the long run each
producer makes zero profit. Capital evolves according to:
Kt+1 = It + (1− δ)Kt (3.8)
Capital good producer maximize his profit by choosing It:
max
{It}t∈Z
(Qt − 1)It − X
2
(
It
Kt−1
− δ
)2
Kt−1 (3.9)
The resulting first order condition provides us with the capital supply
curve (that is the price of a unit of capital stock):
Qt =
[
1 +X
(
It
Kt
− δ
)]
(3.10)
3.3 Banking Sector
3.3.1 Deposit Banks
This section follows Glocker and Towbin [2012]. Deposit banks operate in
perfectly competitive input and output markets. (1− ςt(j)) share of deposits
collected from households are rented to lending banks on the interbank rate
and the remainder is held as reserves at the central bank which is paid back
at the reserve rate iRt . A representative deposit bank pays a deposit interest
rate iDt (j) to households and earns a gross return equal to i
IB
t from renting
some fraction of his funds to lending banks. Therefore, the balance sheet of
deposit bank is as follows:
Dt(j) = Rest(j) +D
IB
t (j) (3.11)
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Here, Dt(j) is the amount of the j’th bank’s deposits collected from the
households. Rest is the reserves which is hold at the central bank. Lastly,
DIBt is the loans to the lending banks.
Holding reserves has a convex cost Gςt(j) for deposit banks. There are
two motivations of this convexity: first, due to decreasing returns to scale,
benefits of holding reserves may decline over time. Secondly, the central bank
may have the incentive to punish banks with larger penalties as the deviations
from target value increase.
Gςt(j) = ψ1(ςt(j)− ςMPt ) + ψ2/2(ςt(j)− ςMPt )2 (3.12)
Given the target level of reserve requirement ratio ςMPt , deposit banks has
a cost of deviating from the steady state. If the deposit bank holds less reserve
than the required level, it increases the cost of liquidity management.On the
other hand, in case of holding excess reserves decreases this cost. Therefore,
the cost function parameter ψ1 < 0. The other cost function parameter
ψ2 > 0 because it guides dynamics around the steady state.
Therefore, the optimization problem of the deposit bank is as follows:
max
ςt(j),Dt(j)t∈Z
Divst (j) (3.13)
subject to
Divst (j) = [(1− ςt(j))iIBt + ςt(j)iRt − iDt (j)−Gςt(j)]Dt(j) (3.14)
The first order conditions are:
−[iIBt − iRt ]− ψ1 = ψ2(ςt(j)− ςMPt ) (3.15)
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iDt (j) = (1− ςt(j))iIBt + ςt(j)iRt −Gςt(j) (3.16)
Equation 3.15 determines the bank’s optimal reserve ratio, ς.Asthespreadbetweeninterbankrateandreserverateincreases, optimalreserveratiodecreaseswhereasasrequiredreserveratioincreases, optimalreserveratioincreases.Equation3.16showsthatdepositrateisaweightedaverageoftheratesreceivedfromlendingandholdingreservesnetofoperatingcost.
3.3.2 Lending Banks
As stated before, the main contribution of this paper is to allow banks to
borrow from abroad. Lending banks are the only agents which can obtain
funds from abroad as well as from the deposit banks. I assume that apart
from being denominated in foreign currency, both deposit bank funds, DIBt ,
and foreign funds, Bt, can be used in similar means to generate loans in
the domestic economy. Therefore, we do not need to specify a technology
that combines both funds to generate a loan. The model does not include
any set limitations, however when numerically solving the model I adjust
all the parameters in such a way that the total amount of loans needed is
always greater than what they collect from deposit banks. By doing so, the
remainder will always be obtained from abroad no matter what the foreign
interest rate is . Lastly, lending banks are also subject to reserve requirements
in domestic currency and holding foreign bonds is costly. Thus, lending banks
balance sheet reads:
Lt +Rt = StBt +D
IB
t (3.17)
Rt = ς
MP
t ∗ (StBt +DIBt ) (3.18)
DIBt = (1− ςt)Dt (3.19)
Here, if we write both loans to the entrepreneurs, Lt and reserves, Rt, in
terms of deposits, Dt, this gives us the following equations:
Lt = (1− ςMPt )StBt + (1− ςMPt )(1− ςt)Dt (3.20)
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Rt = ς
MP
t StBt + ς
MP
t (1− ςt)Dt (3.21)
Therefore, a one percent rise in deposits increases the amount of loans by
(1− ςMPt )(1− ςt) whereas reserves by ςMPt (1− ςt) percent.
Lending banks maximize their expected profit subject to balance sheet
equation above:
max
Bt,Dtt∈Z
iLt Lt + i
R
t Rt − iIBt DIBt −
St+1
St
i∗tBt −
ψB
2
Pt
(
StBt
Pt
− SB
P
)2
(3.22)
Here, S, B and P are the steady state values. Thus, at steady state, cost
of holding bond is zero.
Resulting optimality condition gives us uncovered interest parity condition
and the definition of interest rate on loans:
iIBt − ψB
(
StBt
Pt
− SB
P
)
= i∗t
St+1
St
(3.23)
iLt =
iIBt − iRt ςMPt
1− ςMPt
. (3.24)
where
∂iLt
∂ςMPt
> 0
Equation 3.24 is important because it gives us the relationship between re-
quired reserves and the lending rate, iLt . When deposits obtained from deposit
bankers increase by one percent, this will generate
(1− ςMPt )iLt + ςMPt iRt (3.25)
marginal benefit to the lending banker. This marginal benefit will be equal-
ized with a marginal cost of interbank rate.
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3.3.3 Financial Contract Between Lending Banks and
Entrepreneurs
The financial contract between lending banks and entrepreneurs constitutes
an important role in creating the financial accelerator mechanism in the econ-
omy. As it is mentioned above, at the end of time t, entrepreneurs finance
themselves with their net worth and borrowings from lending banks and
abroad. The borrowing mechanism is based on a contract between lend-
ing banks and entrepreneurs. Assuming a continuum of risk-neutral en-
trepreneurs indexed by j ∈ (0, 1), let Nt(j) be the net worth, Lt(j) be stock
of loans, Bt(j) be foreign assets, Kt(j) be the end of time t capital stock and
Qt(j) be current market price of one unit of capital. Then, entrepreneurial
balance sheet is,
QtKt(j) = Nt(j) + Lt(j) (3.26)
Capital is responsive to both aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks and id-
iosyncratic shocks are private information for entrepreneurs. Therefore, when
the entrepreneur buys capital at time t, an idiosyncratic shock drawn by the
entrepreneur changes Kt(j) to ω(j)Kt(j) at the beginning of t+1. Here, ω(j)
is i.i.d across firms and time and ln(ω(j)) ∼ N(µω, σ2ω). Moreover, the cu-
mulative and density functions are respectively Pr(ω(j) < x) = F (x) and
f(x) = F ′(x).
The financial contract is similar to standard debt contract. In this sense,
when the entrepreneur draws an idiosyncratic shock ω(j), we have two sce-
narios. If the realized idiosyncratic shock is above a threshold value ω(j),
then he pays iLt Lt(j). Otherwise, he will go bankrupt.
Therefore, ω(j) should satisfy the following equation:
ω(j)QtKt(j)Etr
K
t+1 = i
L
t
Pt
Pt+1
Lt(j) (3.27)
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According to the equation, expected market value of capital purchased
this period under the threshold idiosyncratic shock is at least equal to debt
payments.
Additionally, I make the costly state verification assumption which is pro-
posed by Townsend [1979] and used by both Bernanke et al. [1999] and
Glocker and Towbin [2012]. According to this assumption, when the en-
trepreneurs go bankrupt (the case where ω(j) < ω(j)), the financial interme-
diary must pay an auditing cost in order to observe the entrepreneurs realized
return. They must give everything they have to the bank but the bank re-
covers only (1−µ) fraction of the value of such firms. Here, µ is the degree of
monitoring cost. The smaller the µ is the lesser effective financial accelerator
mechanism is. Therefore, after the monitoring cost is paid, what is left from
the entrepreneur is as follows:
(1− µ)ω(j)rKt+1Kt(j)Qt (3.28)
Therefore, expected return to the entrepreneur is maximized in the opti-
mal contract by
Et
[∫ ∞
ω(j)
(
ω(j)QtKt(j)Etr
K
t+1 − iLt
Pt
Pt+1
Lt(j)
)
f(ω)dω
]
(3.29)
Also, the participation constraint of the bank is
(1− F (ω(j))) zLt
Pt
Pt+1
Lt(j) + (1− µ)
∫ ω(j)
0
ωEtr
K
t+1Kt(j)Qtf(ω)dω =
iLt
Etpit+1
Lt(j)
(3.30)
In equation, the first term on the left hand side is the amount lending
bank receives once the entrepreneur does not default, the second term, on
the other hand, is the amount received when he defaults. The term on the
right hand side is bank’s cost of raising funds.
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3.4 Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs play an important role between intermediate good producers
and capital good producers. By using their net worth and loans from the lend-
ing banks, they buy capital goods from the capital good producers and rent
it to intermediate good producers at the rental rate zt. Following [Bernanke
et al., 1999], if we define premium on external funds as s =
EtrKt+1
iLt /Etpit+1
, the first
order condition of optimal contracting problem with non-stochastic monitor-
ing cost is as follows:
Kt(j)Qt = f
(
Etr
K
t+1
iLt /Etpit+1
)
Nt(j) (3.31)
where f ′(.) > 0. This equation shows that the ratio of capital expenditures to
the net worth increases with the discounted return to capital. An equivalent
way of expressing this equation is:
Etr
K
t+1 = h
(
Nt(j)
QtKt(j)
)
iLt
Etpit+1
(3.32)
where h′(.) < 0. This equality says that if an entrepreneur is not fully self-
financed, the expected return to capital has to be equal to the marginal cost
of external finance. Here, entrepreneur’s real return on capital depends on
rental rate and depreciation of capital adjusted for capital price valuation
effects:
rKt =
zt +Qt(1− δ)
Qt−1
(3.33)
Entrepreneurs’ surviving probability is v so they leave the market with a
probability (1−v). If they leave, they just consume their net worth. Departing
entrepreneurs bequeath a small transfer g to the new ones. Gertler et al.
[2007] and Bernanke et al. [1999] specify this small transfer as the managerial
wage of departing entrepreneurial workers. For simplicity, I do not define
entrepreneurial worker. Instead, I equalize it to zero since it will not change
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the main implications of the model. Giving a small number does not change
the main implications of the model, as well. Therefore, the aggregate net
worth is:
Nt = vVt + (1− v)g (3.34)
where Vt is the net worth of surviving entrepreneurs. Following Glocker and
Towbin [2012], I assume a fixed lending rate so net worth of surviving capital
will be:
Vt = (1− µ)rKt Qt−1Kt−1 − iLt−1
Pt−1
Pt
Lt−1 (3.35)
Equilibrium in the Financial Sector
Since all deposit banks face the same interbank and reserve interest rate,
first optimality condition of deposit banks states that ςt(j) = ςt. All real
seigniorage revenue is distributed as a lump-sum transfer to the households
and it is defined by:
T st = ςtDt −
iRt−1
pit
ςt−1Dt−1 (3.36)
3.5 Intermediate Good Producers
Intermediate good producers rent capital from entrepreneurs and buy labor
from households. They operate in a perfectly competitive market. With
these factors, they produce intermediate goods, yt which are later sold to
final good producers in the monopolistic market. A representative producer
i’s production function is Cobb-Douglas with constant returns to scale:
yt(i) = AtKt−1(i)αht(i)1−α (3.37)
Here, At is the production technology which is driven by an AR(1) process.
At = ρAt−1 + uAt (3.38)
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The main objective of intermediate goods producers is maximizing their prof-
its. Therefore, their objective function is as follows:
maxAtKt−1(i)αht(i)1−α − ht(i)wt − ztKt−1(i) (3.39)
The resulting optimality condition implies ht(i)Wt
ztKt−1(i)
= 1−α
α
and marginal cost
(mc) is
1
At
w1−αt z
α
t
[(
1− α
α
)α
+
(
1− α
α
)(α−1)]
(3.40)
3.6 Final Good Producers
Final goods producers buy intermediate goods in a monopolistic market and
sell them to households as consumption goods and to capital goods produc-
ers as investment good in a perfectly competitive market. Before proceeding
with the optimality conditions of final good producers, I will first cover the
optimality condition between intermediate good producer and final good pro-
ducer.
Intermediate good producers adjust their prices according to Calvo-type price
staggering condition. The probability that a firm can adjust its prices at
period k is (1 − θ)k. Therefore, final goods producer adjust its prices by
maximizing its life-time profits:
max
p∗t t∈Z
Et
[ ∞∑
k=0
(βθ)kΛt,t+kDiv
R
t+k|t(i)
]
(3.41)
where DivRt+k|t(i) =
p∗t
Pt
yt(i)−mct+k|t(i)yt+k|t(i). The first order condition is
Et
[ ∞∑
k=0
(βθ)kΛt,t+kyt+k|t(i)
(
p∗t
Pt+k
− 
1− mct+k|t(i)
)]
= 0 (3.42)
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3.7 Equilibrium
In equilibrium,
Yt =
Pt
PHt
[Ct + It +Gt] +
St
PHt
Xt +
Pt
PHt
Ψt (3.43)
where Xt stands for net exports expressed in foreign currency and total ad-
justment cost is:
Ψt = Kt−1
(
X
2
(
It
Kt−1
− δ)2 + µω(j)rKt Qt−1
)
+Gςt(.) +
ψB
2
(
St
Pt
Bt)
2 (3.44)
Evolution of bond holdings is defined as follows:
NXt = it−1StBt−1 − StBt (3.45)
In this model, I define bonds as liabilities rather than assets, so the current
account is the net foreign liabilities:
CAt = Bt−1 −Bt (3.46)
Finally, the balance of payment identity is as follows:
i∗t−1StBt−1 = P
H
t Yt − Pt[Ct + It +Gt] + StBt − PtΨt (3.47)
3.8 Government Sector
Now, suppose that hat denotes the percentage deviations of a variable from
steady state while tilde denotes level deviations. In this framework, suppose
that the monetary policy rule obeys the following rules:
iˆIBt = φpi,iIBpit + φY,iIB Yˆt (3.48)
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ς˜MPt = φL,ςMP Lˆt (3.49)
According to deviations in price level and income, central bank adjusts in-
terbank interest rate and according to the deviations in stock of loans it plays
with reserve requirements. The reason of why I use this kind of monetary
policy is as follows: This policy regime has both financial and price stability
objective Glocker and Towbin [2012]. As it is known the reserve requirement
is a financial tool and it is expected to be effective mostly in financial sector.
Therefore, I find it convenient to make reserve requirements sensitive to only
a financial variable. I may add variations in income and price levels to equa-
tion 3.49, but this would make it hard to differentiate the effects of interbank
rate and reserve requirements.
In order to analyse the effectiveness of reserve requirement on external
account imbalances, I will introduce reserve requirements to the system as
a transitory shock, and observe how the current/capital account responds
accordingly.
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CHAPTER 4
CALIBRATION
Most of the parameters of the model are from the papers which study open
economy DSGE models with financial accelerator mechanism such as Glocker
and Towbin [2012], Bernanke et al. [1999] and Gertler et al. [2007]. Table 4.1
provides the values of the parameters:
Table 4.1: Calibration of Parameters
Param. Value Description
δ 0.025 Depreciation Rate of Capital
β 0.985 Discount Factor
α 0.33 Capital Share in Production
φ 1.00 Inverse of Frisch Labor Supply Elasticity
θ 0.75 Degree of Price Stickiness
v 0.97 Survival Rate of Entrepreneurs
X 0.25 Capital Adjustment Cost
η 0.05 Elasticity of External Finance Premium to
Entrepreneurs’ level of leverage
ψB 1 Adjustment Cost for Net Foreign Assets
γ 0.75 Share of Domestically Produced Goods
in Domestic Absorption
 6.5 Elasticity of Substitution
µ 0.12 Fraction of Auditing Cost
ψ2 0.01 Cost of Deviating from target
reserve requirement
Other than these parameters, I adjust ψ1 such that it implies an interest
rate spread iIB− iRt equal to 150 basis points on quarterly basis and a steady
state share of reserve ratio of 0.10. Here, 0.10 percent required reserve is
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the average level for Turkey before the recent increase in 2011. Following,
Bernanke et al. [1999] and Glocker and Towbin [2012], I choose external
finance premium as 50 basis points. Combined with the steady state level of
interest rate on lending, this gives us the real return of capital, rK .
In order to study the effects of Turkeys recent monetary policy on its
external imbalances , I choose parameter values to match Turkish facts as
much as possible. The data are obtained from Turkish Central Bank database.
After I collect all the data from 1988 to 2011, I calculate ratios I need. Instead
of using the values of recent years, I took the averages of all ratios. Also,
in order to be comparable with the other emerging market papers in the
literature, I choose not to use some of the extreme values such as consumption
and government shares. In Turkey, these ratios are 70
In order to solve the model, I first log-linearise the system around the
steady state and then hit the system with six type of shocks. These are
productivity shock, foreign interest rate shock, government spending shock,
export shock and shocks to reserve requirements and monetary policy.The
reason of why I need six different shocks is as follows: In this model, as in
Glocker and Towbin [2012] model, government expenditures, foreign interest
rates and exports are exogenously given to the system. Since omitting all of
these exogenous values makes the model hard to solve, I find it more conve-
nient to hold them in the system. All of them, except the monetary policy
shock, follow AR(1) processes. Monetary policy shock hits the policy interest
rate iIBt . Both reserve requirement and monetary policy shocks are seen on
the policy functions below. The values below are taken from Christoffel et al.
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[2008]:
At = 0.89At−1 + uAt (4.1)
i∗t = 0.88i
∗
t−1 + u
i∗
t (4.2)
gt = 0.86gt−1 + u
g
t (4.3)
xt = 0.80xt−1 + uxt (4.4)
where variance of the shock processes are 1.13, 0.43, 4.63 and 5.01 respectively.
Lastly, I choose the variance of monetary policy shock as 1.50 and that of
reserve requirement shock as 1.63.
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CHAPTER 5
RESULTS
As it is stated, there are six type of shocks in this model. However, since my
main aim is to observe the effectiveness of reserve requirements on current
account deficit, I will only analyse productivity shock, monetary policy shock
and reserve requirement shock. The others are beyond the scope of my thesis
and can be analysed for future work.
5.1 Positive Productivity Shock
The figure 5.1 and 5.2 show impulse responses to an expansionary produc-
tivity shock. Analysing the response of the model economy to a productivity
disturbance provides a good way to evaluate my framework since a wide lit-
erature has reached a consensus on how an economy reacts to this kind of
shock. The above mentioned figures provide supporting evidence while pre-
senting some new evidence on the behaviour of some other variables which
are specific to the current model.
According to the figure 5.1, increasing output due to productivity shock
raises the interbank rate because of the simple Taylor rule. Then, lending
banks borrow less from the deposit banks. Since I assume a constant spread
between interbank rate and interest rate on reserves, it is normal to see higher
interests on reserves. Additionally, uncovered interest parity condition (see
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Figure 5.1: Positive Productivity Shock
Figure 5.2: Positive Productivity Shock
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equation 3.23) suggests a depreciation of exchange rate due to higher inter-
bank rate. Therefore, it is now more expensive for lending banks to borrow
from abroad, as well. That is why we observe a decrease in foreign debts.
Overall, lending banks borrow less from the two channels of borrowing.
It is an undoubted fact that it would be more deductive story if we ob-
serve increasing foreign debts when the domestic borrowing become expensive
compared to foreign borrowing. In my model, when the productivity shock
hits the economy, increasing interbank rates makes foreign borrowing cheaper
than domestic borrowing. One can observe it from the initial impulse response
of the bonds (B in figure 5.2) but it is not a remarkable increase compared
to the reduction in domestic debts. Moreover, even that small increase in
foreign borrowing starts to decrease as exchange rate adjusts next period.
On the other hand, as it is seen from figure 5.2, transitory productivity
shock has caused an output growth which eventually increases the rental rate
and real return on capital. As expected, this will trigger capital accumulation
in the country. Moreover, rising wage rates bring about high labour supply.
Since it is a transitory shock, households know that this prosperity will not
last forever, so they start to consume less and save more. This decrease in
consumption can also be explained by increase in deposit rates. When the
deposit rates increase, saving become more attractive than consuming for
households. This is another reason of why we see a consumption reduction.
Keeping in mind that current account is the difference between savings and
investments, higher savings causes a rise in current account.
Therefore, these impulse responses suggest that this model is a decent
laboratory which is able to capture the basic facts such as increasing interest
rates and output as a result of a productivity shock.
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5.2 Monetary Policy Shock
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 report the impulse responses of several variables to a
monetary policy shock. A contractionary monetary policy raises interbank
rates by Taylor rule. As mentioned above, this makes foreign debts cheaper
than domestic debts. Thus, it is expected to see a rise in bonds as well as a fall
in deposits. However, fall in domestic debts is more than the rise in foreign
debts, so total stock of loans declines. Therefore, entrepreneurs demand less
capital than before.
Figure 5.3: Monetary Policy Shock
On the other hand, the economy will have higher interest rates on loans.
By external finance premium, it increases the real return on capitals and
so does the capital accumulation. Lastly, as the current account is the net
foreign liabilities between two periods, rise in foreign debts decreases the
current account. From here, we can say that contractionary monetary policy
deepens current account deficit in a country.
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Figure 5.4: Monetary Policy Shock
5.3 Reserve Requirement Shock
The main contribution of this thesis is discussed in the subsection, where
we are able to show that the use of reserve requirements to adjust current
account imbalances may be a correct choice of policy. Figure 5.5 and 5.6
report the impulse responses of several variables to one percentage increase
in required reserves.
As it is seen from equation 3.25, higher reserve requirements increases the
marginal benefit of obtaining one percent deposit more from deposit bankers.
On the other hand, by external finance premium, it decreases marginal return
to capital, so capital supply decreases. By equation 3.37, GDP level declines
and it brings about lower interbank rates by Taylor rule. Now, if we examine
these two different forces by looking at the lending bankers’ optimization, we
realize that, marginal cost of domestic borrowing decreases while its benefit
increases. Since, lending bankers cannot influence the movements of interbank
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rate, they equalize their marginal benefit and marginal cost by decreasing
the lending rate (see Figure 5.5). This is striking because it suggests that
increasing reserve requirements decrease the lending rates. However, it can
be explained. If lending banks had a direct influence on interbank rates, or
else if central bank actively increased the interbank rates, lending banks would
not optimally decrease their lending rates but instead they would increase it.
However, in this case, they lower it because decreasing capital accumulation
affects GDP level and so does the interbank rate.
Lastly, given exogenously determined foreign interest rates, higher inter-
bank rates make domestic borrowing cheaper than foreign borrowing. Thus,
one would expect to observe increased deposits from domestic units, with
lower borrowing from the rest of the world. Hence the higher current account
surplus. Then, for a country with current account deficit, increasing reserve
requirements can be an effective tool to use. However, higher reserve require-
ment increases current account in two quarters but after about ten quarters,
it will go back to its old level.
When banking sector has multiple channels to borrow, we see that it
gives banks flexibility to move from one channel to another in different cases.
A central bank’s primary aim of increasing required reserves is to decrease
the credit growth. Therefore, higher reserve requirements generally should
increase the interest rates in the economy. However, in this model this is not
the exact case because interbank rate is adversely affected by the changes in
output level in the country and decreases. This reduces the marginal cost of
lending bankers and lending rates decreases despite the positive relationship
between reserve requirements and lending rates. This thesis is not alone
with respect to this exceptional result. There are also some papers such as
Montoro [2010] which displays a negative relationship between interbank rate
and reserve requirements.
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Figure 5.5: Reserve Requirement Shock
Figure 5.6: Reserve Requirement Shock
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS
Deepening current account deficit continues to be one of the primary economic
concerns of Turkey. Over the past year, in order to rebalance this deficit,
Turkish Central Bank has started to implement some macro-prudential poli-
cies given the link between the current account the country’s financial stabil-
ity. For this goal they have been using the reserve requirements, an uncon-
ventional tool in this aspect as well.
As the governor of the Turkish Central Bank states in the Bank’s finan-
cial stability report, although it is roughly known how required reserves might
affect the current account deficit, there is not formal theoretical framework
that allows us to make any formal inferences Bas¸c¸ı and Kara [2011]. In order
to fill this gap this thesis builds a DSGE model with the financial accelerator
mechanism including a banking sector which engages in international borrow-
ing. In this framework, this thesis allows examination of reserve requirements
as a policy tool to correct external (current/capital) account imbalances in
developing countries.
Originally, higher reserve requirements tend to decrease credits which
eventually implies lower consumption. By this way, countries like Turkey
intent to decrease current account deficit. However, when the banking sector
have multiple channels to borrow in order to create a loan for entrepreneurs,
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how much the credit growth decreases depends mostly on which channel is su-
perior compared to other. In this model, although rising reserve requirements
do not brings about a decrease in overall credits, it decreases the amount of
loans obtained from abroad. This constitutes the main channel of reserve
requirements against external imbalances In Turkey.
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